

CENTAR ZA
DRUŠTVENI DIJALOG I
REGIONALNE INICIJATIVE



Normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina from citizens perspective

WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE FEEL?

Name of Publication:

Normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina from citizens perspective - What we know and what we feel?

Published by:

Center for social dialogue and regional initiatives (CSDRI)

Research conducted by:

Sprint Insight doo

Place and date of issue:

Belgrade, October 2019

This publication is part of the project “Comprehensive understanding of comprehensive normalization” managed by Center for social dialogue and regional initiatives (CSDRI) and supported by United States Embassy in Serbia. The content of this research is the responsibility of the Center for social dialogue and regional initiatives (CSDRI) and do not necessarily reflect the views of United States Embassy in Serbia.

► INTRODUCTION

The Kosovo problem has been a key national and political issue in Serbia for decades. The prevalence and over-saturation with the Kosovo issue in the Serbian public discourse affected political social and economic dynamics. Most importantly, Serbia's EU enlargement perspective, as a proclaimed foreign policy priority, is directly tied to a normalization of relations with Pristina. Chapter 35 of Serbia's accession negotiations with the EU stipulates that "the advancement of Serbia's to the EU will be measured in particular against its continued engagement towards a visible and sustainable improvement in relations with Kosovo." What's more, the EU common position on Chapter 35 asserts that if "progress in the normalization of relations with Kosovo, significantly lags behind progress in the negotiations overall," the Commission could withhold opening or closing negotiating chapters.

Since 2011, Belgrade engaged in technical and political dialogue with Pristina authorities in Brussels. Up-to-date, around 30 agreements were reached at the technical and political levels. Most of these agreements addressed issues significant to the life of citizens and facilitated the integration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo's legal and political system. However, following eight years of EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and more than six years from the signing of landmark "First Agreement on principles governing normalization of relations," the prospect of reaching a comprehensive legally binding agreement between both parties remains uncertain. Formal discussions on normalizing relations based on protection of non-majority community rights of Kosovo Serbs through the establishment of Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities have since July 2018 given space to reintroducing the notion of territorial delineation and land swap.

As a result of internal infight between President and Prime Minister and inability to come to coherent policy on Belgrade-Pristina, the Kosovo government decided to introduce a 100% tariff on the goods originating from Serbia in November 2018, signaling the long break in the formal talks facilitated by Brussels. The two sides have not officially met to discuss dialogue related issues since then. The international community has called on Belgrade and Pristina to avoid actions that hinder the resumption of dialogue, pressing the Pristina to suspend tariffs and Belgrade to halt "de-recognition campaign" against Kosovo. However, a continuation of dialogue is further hindered by successive elections in Kosovo, held on 6 October and one in Serbia, expected for early spring 2020. Furthermore, the lack of consensus in the international community, particularly between the United States and Germany of what could be an acceptable outcome of the dialogue, further complicates the issue. While United States has shown its commitment for swift resumption and completion of Belgrade-Pristina dialogue by appointing Richard Grenell as the US Special Envoy for the talks, Germany and European Union seem to be more reluctant and careful to explore other avenues of the possible agreement except those set by deals made in Brussels.

Whatever the future of Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, both sides would have to find a way to "sell" some kind of agreement to their respective publics. This could particularly come challenging to President Vučić and the Government of Serbia. Serbian claims over Kosovo are grounded on deep symbolic construction of this territory as a "homeland", a "cradle of Serbian culture", a "Serbian Jerusalem", and "heart of Serbia", while loss of Kosovo is perceived as "injustice", "betrayal", "shame", "loss of identity". Such a strong view on Kosovo in the Serbian public point to the need to ameliorate the emotional and symbolic roots of this issue before reaching a sustainable, legally binding agreement.

This public opinion report wants to come to the core of "how citizens feel" about the process of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, what do they think and believe. It aims to analyze and understand the meaning and importance of Kosovo in the Serbian public and assess possible scenarios for reaching a comprehensive agreement on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The goal is, therefore, to determine what would be the most favorable and realistic scenario – for the Serbian public – in reaching a legally binding agreement.

► HOUSE OF INSIGHTS

- The research has shown that Kosovo problem remains one of the critical political issues in Serbia. Kosovo's topic provokes emotional reactions, which points to the difficulty of demobilizing long-standing narratives in which Kosovo is represented as a cornerstone of "Serbian state" and "Serbian identity." Such narratives are underpinned by highly negative attitudes and stereotypes about Albanians, as presented by the "high ethnic distance," which on a scale from 0 to 1 stands at 0.62. Furthermore, the fact that only 14.1% of respondents would agree to support recognition Kosovo's independence if it were a precondition for Serbia's EU membership, while 71.7% opposed it points to the fact that highly «emotional» narrative on Kosovo still prevails over more «realistic» attitudes. Further confirmation that Kosovo remains important in the public discourse is the fact that a large number of respondents are ready to mobilize politically in the events related to Kosovo. A particular trigger would be a situation in which rights and freedoms of Kosovo Serb are jeopardized, or in the case of endangerment of Serbian religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo.
- That recognition of Kosovo independence would be hard to sell to the citizens tells the fact that only between 15% and 20% of respondents would accept some of the scenarios which entail that option, even in cases in which it brings some concessions to Serbia, such as "partition" or "exchange of territories." The only scenario that is somewhat acceptable in case of "recognition" is a maximalist and unlikely scenario by which in addition to territory in the north, Kosovo concedes Association/Community for Kosovo Serbs south of river Ibar, as well as extra-territoriality for the Serbian Orthodox Church monasteries. Such a scenario would gain the support of 36.4% of respondents. The only other scenario which would gain some traction among citizens is scenario by which Serbia does not recognize Kosovo but accepts Kosovo membership in the UN, while in exchange, it gets Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities for Kosovo Serbs.
- This information becomes even more important when we reduce the support of citizens for the two most prominent scenarios to resolve the status of Kosovo as perceived by the public. First is a comprehensive agreement on normalization of relations, which entails an exchange of territories, whereby Serbia gets four municipalities in the north, while Kosovo gets parts of Presevo Valley. According to this agreement, Serbia recognizes Kosovo's independence, and Kosovo becomes a member of the UN. The second is a comprehensive agreement on normalization of relations, which entails the establishment of Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities. According to this agreement, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo formally, but Kosovo becomes a member of the UN. As many as 72.9% of respondents would rather accept a deal that does not include Kosovo recognition. Therefore, the second scenario is more appealing to the public. The main reason for such an opinion is that there is no "de facto" recognition of Kosovo by Serbia. Furthermore, in the eyes of respondents, such agreement would enable the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as well as protection of Serbian cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo. Respecting and guaranteeing the rights of Serbs and preserving religious and cultural heritage are considered extremely important by citizens in the context of the Belgrade-Pristina deal.
- The majority of citizens, as many as 55%, supports Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. Still, the fact that 62.3% of respondents are not familiar with the content of agreements made in Brussels is a clear sign that the dialogue lacks transparency. Only 12.6% of respondents are well-informed about Brussels dialogue.

► METHODOLOGY

Time span of the research: Public opinion research was conducted from 23-30. September 2019

Research method: F2F survey

Population: Serbia without Kosovo (120 research units); 18+ (6.724.949 voters)

Type of sample: Three-stage random stratified sample

Stratification method: 9 strata (criteria: polling station size & region)

Respondents selection method: Polling station; Household; First next birthday

Sample size: 1173 respondents

Margin of error: + / - 2,8

DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE - DEMOGRAPHY

1. Sex

| | |
|--------|-------|
| Female | 51.4% |
| Male | 48.6% |

2. Average age: 44

3. Place of residence in Serbia?

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Belgrade | 23.4% |
| Vojvodina | 26.4% |
| West Serbia | 13.2% |
| East Serbia | 8% |
| Central Serbia | 15.1% |
| South Serbia | 13.8% |

4. Settlement:

| | |
|-------|-------|
| Urban | 59.9% |
| Rural | 40.1% |

5. Education:

| | |
|---|-------|
| Elementary education | 29.2% |
| High School education | 54.3% |
| Attained a college or university degree | 16.5% |

6. How would you describe yourself in terms of religion?

| | |
|-----------------------------|-------|
| Non-religious | 12.3% |
| Moderately religious person | 60.8% |
| Very religious person | 20.9% |
| I don't want to answer | 6% |

7. Employment status:

| | |
|---|-------|
| Employed in public sector | 17.7% |
| Employed in private sector | 18.6% |
| Self-employed | 7.8% |
| Employed in the gray zone | 4.1% |
| Not-employed (actively seeking a job) | 7.9% |
| Unemployed (I don't search for a job actively) | 5.9% |
| Student-high school student | 12.8% |
| Retired | 25.3% |

7. Overall, how satisfied are you lately?

The average grade on the scale from 1 (I am not satisfied at all) to 10 (I am very satisfied) is **6.25**

| | |
|----------------------|-------|
| I am not satisfied | 14.9% |
| Moderately satisfied | 50% |
| Satisfied | 35.1% |

8. How would you assess the financial situation in your household?

| | |
|--|-------|
| With current income, we find it hard to make ends meet. | 14.9% |
| We get along, but it's far away from any stability. | 41.1% |
| The situation is not bad; we have enough money to sustain our needs. | 38.1% |
| Condition is great; we have enough money not to worry about it. | 5.9% |

9. When you observe your family experience in the last ten years, would you consider yourself as transition loser or transition winner?

| | |
|--|-------|
| Transition loser | 37.6% |
| Neither loser nor winner of transition | 52% |
| Transition winner | 10.4% |

► SURVEY RESULTS

10. How often do you follow politics?

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| I don't follow at all | 13.6% |
| I mostly don't follow | 31.4% |
| I mostly follow | 42% |
| I follow often | 13% |

11. What is your main source of information about politics?

| | |
|-----------------------|-------|
| TV | 53% |
| Internet media | 14.4% |
| Social media | 11.8% |
| I do not get informed | 8.4% |
| Press | 7.6% |
| Web portals | 4.1% |
| Radio | 0.7% |

- Segmentation on traditional and new media

| | |
|-------------------|-------|
| Traditional media | 66.9% |
| New media | 33.1% |

12. Which daily newspaper do you read mostly?

| | |
|-------------------------|-------|
| Blic | 26.4% |
| Kurir | 15.2% |
| Informer | 14.2% |
| Danas | 10.3% |
| Večernje novosti | 8.7% |
| Politika | 8.5% |
| Ostalo | 7.2% |
| Alo | 4.8% |
| Telegraf | 3.7% |
| Lokalne novine | 0.3% |
| Press | 0.2% |
| Nin | 0.2% |
| Nedeljnik | 0.1% |

13. On which TV station, do you usually get informed about politics?

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| RTS | 47.1% |
| Pink | 19.9% |
| N1 | 14% |
| Prva | 9.5% |
| O2 | 3.4% |
| Rest | 2.9% |
| Happy | 2.3% |
| RTV | 0.5% |
| Nova S | 0.2% |
| Local TV channels | 0.1% |
| International TV's (CNN, BBC) | 0.1% |

14. In your opinion, which system of government would benefit Serbia:

| | |
|---|-------|
| Democracy | 45.8% |
| Authoritarian | 8% |
| In principle, democracy, but at this point in time, we need a strong hand. | 46.2% |

15. How important is it to you to live in a country which is governed democratically?

The average grade on the scale from 1 (it is not important) to 10 (it is very important) is 7.35

| | |
|---------------------------------|-------|
| Not important at all | 7.9% |
| It is somewhat important | 36.8% |
| It is very important | 55.3% |

16. Why are you proud to be a Serb?

| | |
|--|-------|
| Because of our history and tradition | 47.9% |
| Because of our successes in sports | 22.9% |
| I am not proud to be a Serb | 8.7%% |
| I am not a Serb | 7% |
| Because of our scientific and technological advancements | 4.2% |
| Because of our advancements in culture and literature | 1.9% |
| Because of fair and equal treatment of all ethnic and social groups | 1.6% |
| Because of our social security system | 1.4% |
| Because of something else | 1.4% |
| Because of our political influence in the world | 1.1% |
| Because of the way democracy functions in our country | 0.7% |
| I am ashamed of being a Serb | 0.6% |
| Because of our economic advancements | 0.5% |

16. Why are you proud to be a Serb?

Index of nationalism from 0 (no nationalism) to 1 (high level of nationalism) is **0.6**

| | |
|--|-------|
| Survival of its own people needs to be the main goal of each individual. | 66% |
| Common heritage is a basis of trust between citizens. | 52.1% |
| Marriage between individuals from different communities or nationalities is less stable than those of the same heritage. | 38.8% |
| The individual can feel completely safe only in the state in which his community is in the majority. | 49.8% |
| Between different nations, it is possible to have cooperation but not trust. | 45.4% |

18. The scale of ethnic distance toward Albanians

Index of ethnic distance from 0 (no distance) to 1 (large ethnic distance) is **0.62**

| “Would you accept that Albanian...” | NO |
|--|-------|
| ... lives in your state | 38.2% |
| ... lives in your neighborhood, street, apartment building | 45.6% |
| ... be your colleague at work | 42.3% |
| ... be your superior at work | 68.9% |
| ... be a teacher to your children or grandchildren | 75.8% |
| ... be your friend who you often visit | 58.1% |
| ... be a public official in your country | 83% |
| ... be married to your relatives | 67% |
| ... be married into your family or with your children | 81.5% |
| No ethnic distance | 10.8% |
| Small ethnic distance | 15.3% |
| Middle ethnic distance | 28.9% |
| Large ethnic distance | 45% |

19. In general, would you say that Serbia is heading in a right or wrong direction?

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| In the right direction | 39.8% |
| In the wrong direction | 33.5% |
| I don't know | 26.7% |

20. What do you think, what would be the state of the Serbian economy in the future (3-5 years)?

| | |
|---------------------------|-------|
| Much worse | 9.3% |
| A bit worse | 9.6% |
| Similar to current | 38% |
| A bit better | 33.6% |
| Much better | 9.5% |

21. Do you support the current government lead by Aleksandar Vučić as President?

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| I don't support at all | 22.3% |
| I mostly do not support | 19.8% |
| I mostly support it | 25.7% |
| I totally support it | 19.3% |
| No attitude | 12.9% |

22. How often do you follow news related to Kosovo?

| | |
|------------------------------|-------|
| I don't follow at all | 12.6% |
| I mostly don't follow | 31.5% |
| I mostly follow | 42.8% |
| I follow often | 13.1% |

23. Are you familiar with President Vučić's Kosovo policy?

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| I am not familiar | 58.5% |
| I am somewhat familiar | 24.2% |
| I am very familiar | 17.3% |

24. Do you support President Vučić's policy toward Kosovo?

| | |
|--|-------|
| I don't support at all | 10.4% |
| I mostly do not support it | 8.4% |
| I mostly support it | 22.4% |
| I totally support it | 15.5% |
| I don't know what his policy is | 32% |
| No attitude | 11.2% |

25. Do you support Belgrade-Pristina dialogue?

| | |
|-----------------------------------|-------|
| I don't support at all | 10.3% |
| I mostly do not support it | 11.8% |
| I mostly support it | 39.3% |
| I totally support it | 16% |
| No attitude | 22.5% |

26. Are you truly familiar with agreements made in Brussels in Belgrade-Pristina dialogue?

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| I am not familiar | 62.3% |
| I am somewhat familiar | 25.1% |
| I am very familiar | 12.6% |

27. What do you think is President Vučić's plan for Kosovo?

| | |
|---|-------|
| Recognition of Kosovo in return for EU membership | 23.4% |
| Recognition of Kosovo with the exchange of territories | 14.3% |
| Recognition of Kosovo if the northern part of Kosovo remains in Serbia | 21.1% |
| Recognition of Kosovo which entails a greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo Serbs (A/CSM) | 7.9% |
| Non-recognition of Kosovo with greater degree autonomy for Albanians | 12% |
| Non-recognition of Kosovo with no concessions to Albanians | 21.1% |

28. Attitudes toward Brussels dialogue?

| | I don't agree | Neutral | I agree |
|---|---------------|---------|---------|
| Brussels dialogue led to the improvement of relations between Serbs and Albanians | 55.8% | 27.6% | 16.6% |
| Brussels dialogue leads toward recognition of Kosovo independence | 25% | 25.6% | 49.4% |
| Brussels dialogue abolished the Serbia institution in north Kosovo and enabled integration of Serbs into Kosovo's legal and political system. | 27.2% | 31.8% | 41% |
| Brussels dialogue will enable the protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo. | 42.6% | 27.9% | 29.5% |
| Brussels dialogue will enable the return of Kosovo into a political and legal system of Serbia. | 60.4% | 24.8% | 14.8% |
| Brussels dialogue improved position of Kosovo Serbs | 56.7% | 25.3% | 18% |

29. When you hear the word Kosovo, what is your first thought? (total number of associations)

| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| War | 100 |
| Serbia | 100 |
| Monasteries | 60 |
| Serbian history | 60 |
| Kosovo battle | 55 |
| NATO bombing | 20 |

30. When you hear the word Kosovo which emotion do you feel?

| | |
|-----------------------------|-------|
| Sadness | 28.7% |
| Patriotism/Pride | 18.6% |
| Anxiety | 8.9% |
| Indifference | 8.6% |
| Emphatic pain | 5.6% |
| Angry | 5.6% |
| Fear | 5.4% |
| Excitement | 3.7% |
| Nostalgic | 3.2% |
| Love | 3% |
| Confusion/Insecurity | 2.7% |
| Disgust | 2% |
| Happiness | 1.7% |
| Admiration | 0.6% |
| Boredom | 0.5% |
| Content | 0.5% |
| Awe | 0.2% |
| Interest | 0.2% |

31. What does losing Kosovo mean to you? (number not %)

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| Nothing special | 90 |
| Betrayal | 60 |
| Loss of territory | 60 |
| Defeat | 50 |
| Loss of identity | 50 |
| Sadness | 40 |
| Injustice | 30 |
| Shame | 25 |

32. Kosovo narratives

| | I don't agree | Neutral | I agree |
|--|---------------|---------|---------|
| Kosovo is the heart of Serbia | 15.3% | 16.2% | 68.5% |
| Kosovo is an independent state | 69.4% | 11.7% | 18.9% |
| Albanians settlers, Serbs are natives in Kosovo | 11.5% | 19% | 69.5% |
| Kosovo should be defended by weapons | 48.3% | 19.8% | 31.8% |
| Both Serbs and Albanians have the same right over Kosovo | 56.9% | 20% | 23.1% |
| There would be no Serbia without Kosovo. Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbian state and Serbian identity. | 18.3% | 21.4% | 60.3% |
| Serbia lost the war in Kosovo and therefore lost the right to govern Kosovo. | 66.4% | 16.4% | 17.2% |
| Serbia is a victim of an international plot, and as a result, it lost Kosovo. | 21.9% | 20.1% | 58% |
| It is more important to protect people than land. | 13.3% | 25.9% | 60.8% |
| Kosovo is lost; we have to turn toward strengthening our economy. | 50.1% | 20.2% | 29.7% |
| Serbs have a historical right over Kosovo | 7.6% | 16.9% | 75.5% |
| Serbia cannot trade with Kosovo, Kosovo has no price. | 16.6% | 17.7% | 65.7% |
| We are too small and weak to confront Western powers over Kosovo. | 29.2% | 26% | 44.8% |
| Serbia should never recognize Kosovo as it would mean shame and humiliation. | 14.8% | 17% | 68.2% |
| Recognition of Kosovo is a national treason. | 16.7% | 14.6% | 68.7% |

33. Do you consider that Kosovo is lost?

| | |
|--------------|-------|
| Yes | 33.3% |
| No | 52.1% |
| I don't know | 14.6% |

34. Do you support Serbian membership in the EU?

| | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| I don't support at all | 17% |
| I mostly do not support it | 21.3% |
| I mostly support it | 38.7% |
| I totally support it | 15.6% |
| I don't know | 7.4% |

35. Do you think that recognition of Kosovo is a precondition for membership in the EU?

| | |
|--------------|-------|
| Yes | 65.3% |
| No | 21.5% |
| I don't know | 13.1% |

36. Would you support the recognition of Kosovo's independence if it would be the precondition for Serbia's EU membership?

| | |
|--------------|-------|
| Yes | 14.1% |
| No | 71.7% |
| I don't know | 14.2% |

37. Which Serbian modern politician had the best policy toward Kosovo?

| | |
|---------|-------|
| No one | 57.7% |
| Someone | 42.3% |

38. How would you assess the Kosovo policy of following politicians? (scale from 1 to 5)

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Zoran Đinđić | 3 |
| Aleksandar Vučić | 3 |
| Slobodan Milošević | 2.4 |
| Vojislav Šešelj | 2.3 |
| Vojislav Koštunica | 2.2 |
| Tomislav Nikolić | 2.2 |
| Boris Tadić | 1.9 |
| Čedomir Jovanović | 1.6 |

39. Which Serbian politician in the last 30 years is the most responsible for the situation in Kosovo?

| | |
|---|-------|
| Slobodan Milošević | 46.6% |
| Boris Tadić | 17.2% |
| Aleksandar Vučić | 12.7% |
| Vojislav Koštunica | 6.2% |
| Zoran Đinđić | 5.4% |
| Tomislav Nikolić | 1.3% |
| Someone else (The most common answer Tito) | 10.6% |

40. Which attitude is closest to the truth?

| | |
|---|-------|
| Serbia lost Kosovo before 1999 | 46.7% |
| Serbia lost Kosovo between 2000 and 2008. | 17.5% |
| Serbia lost Kosovo between 2008 and 2012. | 11.3% |
| Serbia lost Kosovo after 2012 | 7.5% |
| I don't know | 17% |

41. Which of the following situation could motivate you to be political and social activism?

| | It could not | Neutral | It could |
|--|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| The interethnic incident in Kosovo | 42.2% | 15.9% | 41.9% |
| Recognition of Kosovo independence | 38.1% | 14.8% | 47.1% |
| Endangering right of Kosovo Serbs | 27.8% | 17.7% | 54.5% |
| Endangering Serbian cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo | 26% | 16.9% | 57.1% |
| Creation of Great Albania | 33.2% | 11.9% | 55% |
| Exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia | 40% | 22% | 38% |

42. In the case of some future referendum, would you support the following solutions?

| | I would not support it | Neutral | I would support it |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo | 78.5% | 9.1% | 12.4% |
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence, and in return, it gets A/CSM and extraterritoriality for SOC monasteries | 58.2% | 20.4% | 20.4% |
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence in return for exchange of territories where Serbia gets four northern Kosovo municipalities and gives parts of Presevo and Bujanovac | 66.7% | 17.5% | 15.8% |
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence and gets three northern Kosovo municipalities, Mitrovica becomes a district, while Gazivode and Trepca are under international management | 57.7% | 23.4% | 18.9% |
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence but gets four northern Kosovo municipalities. | 57.3% | 20.9% | 21.9% |
| Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence but gets four northern Kosovo municipalities. A/CSM in the south and extraterritoriality for SOC monasteries | 44.4% | 19.2% | 36.4% |
| Agreement by which Serbia does not recognize Kosovo independence but accepts Kosovo's UN membership, and gets A/CSM for Kosovo Serbs. | 47.5% | 19.9% | 32.6% |

43. If you would have to choose between two scenarios for resolving the Kosovo problem, which one would you choose?

| | |
|---|--------------|
| <p>A comprehensive agreement on normalization of relations, which entails an exchange of territories, where Serbia gets four municipalities in the north, while Kosovo gets parts of Presevo Valley. According to this agreement, Serbia recognizes Kosovo's independence, and Kosovo becomes a member of the UN.</p> | <p>27.1%</p> |
| <p>A comprehensive agreement on normalization of relations which entails the establishment of A/CSM. According to this agreement, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo formally, but Kosovo becomes a member of the UN.</p> | <p>72.9%</p> |

44. When it comes to a final agreement on the normalization of relations and the status of Kosovo, how important do you find the following questions?

| | I do not agree | Neutral | I agree |
|---|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| <p>Agreement on who manages cultural and religious heritage.</p> | <p>4.9%</p> | <p>11.5%</p> | <p>82.6%</p> |
| <p>Guaranteeing and respecting the rights of Kosovo Serbs.</p> | <p>3%</p> | <p>8%</p> | <p>89%</p> |
| <p>Agreement on who has the right over managing natural resources</p> | <p>4%</p> | <p>12.5%</p> | <p>83.5%</p> |
| <p>Eternal peace between Albanians and Serbs</p> | <p>10.1%</p> | <p>14.7%</p> | <p>75.2%</p> |
| <p>Mutual recognition of war crimes and punishment of those who committed the crimes.</p> | <p>13%</p> | <p>15.9%</p> | <p>71.1%</p> |
| <p>Establishment of Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities</p> | <p>8.3%</p> | <p>17.3%</p> | <p>74.4%</p> |
| <p>Agreement on who is the international sponsor of the deal</p> | <p>11.4%</p> | <p>20%</p> | <p>68.6%</p> |
| <p>That except two governments opposition and NGOs accept the agreement.</p> | <p>25.7%</p> | <p>20%</p> | <p>54.3%</p> |

44. When it comes to a final agreement on the normalization of relations and the status of Kosovo, how important do you find the following questions?

| | I don't agree | Neutral | I agree |
|--|----------------------|----------------|----------------|
| A new conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo | 11.5% | 16.1% | 72.3% |
| Serbia losing support in its accession toward the EU | 15.3% | 23.3% | 61.4% |
| Rise of nationalism in Serbs and Albanians | 7.2% | 18.7% | 74.1% |
| Can lead to mass violations of Kosovo Serbs rights | 8.2% | 13.2% | 78.6% |
| Can lead to imposing international sanctions to Serbia | 23% | 23.6% | 53.4% |
| Can lead to economic deterioration in Serbia | 24.5% | 27.5% | 48% |
| Can lead to the retreat of FDI in Serbia | 25.3% | 29.2% | 45.5% |
| Can lead to a change of international circumstances and in turn, Serbia will have even less support for its Kosovo policy | 18.5% | 25.6% | 55.8% |
| Can lead to a change of international circumstances and in turn, Serbia will have more support for its Kosovo policy | 37.6% | 27.9% | 34.5% |

46. Why is it important that Kosovo remains part of Serbia?

| | Not important | Neutral | Very important |
|---|----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| If we give up on Kosovo, tomorrow, Albanians will take southern Serbia | 13.6% | 11.7% | 74.8% |
| If we give up on Kosovo, tomorrow Vojvodina will ask for the right to secede because it will see that Serbia is weak in defending its territories. | 19.8% | 15.1% | 65.1% |
| Kosovo is our holy land, the cradle of Serbian people, and if we give up on it, we gave up on our identity. | 12.9% | 19.4% | 67.7% |
| If we give up on Kosovo, we will be less secure | 20.5% | 21.4% | 58.1% |
| If we give up on Kosovo, it will be a huge emotional loss for country and citizens | 9.8% | 17.3% | 72.9% |
| If we give up on Kosovo, we will lose friendship with Russia | 36.6% | 26.2% | 37.2% |

▶ POST-STRATIFICATION

GENDER

- **42%** of men support Aleksandar Vučić's (AV) policy on Kosovo, while among women, the support is **33%**.
- **37%** of women don't know what's AV's plan for Kosovo, while only **26%** of men are not familiar with that plan.
- **28%** of man doesn't support the Belgrade Pristina dialogue (Dialogue), while that percentage among women is **16%**.
- **65%** of women think that it is more important to save people than territory, while **55%** of men share that opinion.

AGE

- **AV plan is non-recognition of Kosovo with no concessions to Albanians:**
 - **18%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **26%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **51%** of over 55 age group agrees
- **AV plan is Recognition of Kosovo in return for EU membership:**
 - **36%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **24%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **12%** of over 55 age group agrees
- **Supports the current Government (AV)**
 - **27%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **37%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **66%** of over 55 age group agrees
- **Supports the AV policy on Kosovo:**
 - **23%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **38%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **61%** of over 55 age group agrees
- **Supports the Dialogue**
 - **44%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **50%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **69%** of over 55 age group agrees
- **Considers Kosovo is lost:**
 - **42%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **37%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **22%** of over 55 age group agrees

- **Serbia is a victim of an international plot, and as a result, it lost Kosovo:**
 - **49%** of the 18-34 age group agrees
 - **33%** of the 35-54 age group agrees
 - **70%** of over 55 age group agrees

EDUCATION (highest education breakdown)

- **Supports the current Government (AV)**
 - **50%** of the population with primary school agrees
 - **42%** of the population with high school agrees
 - **29%** of the population with higher education agrees
- **AV plan is non-recognition of Kosovo with no concessions to Albanians:**
 - **46%** of the population with primary school agrees
 - **30%** of the population with high school agrees
 - **21%** of the population with higher education agrees
- **AV plan is the recognition of Kosovo with the exchange of territories**
 - **6%** of the population with primary school agrees
 - **17%** of the population with high school agrees
 - **20%** of the population with higher education agrees
- **Supports the AV policy on Kosovo:**
 - **52%** of the population with primary school agrees
 - **35%** of the population with high school agrees
 - **23%** of the population with higher education agrees
- **“Kosovo is the heart of Serbia” emotional narrative:**
 - **82%** of the population with primary school supports
 - **67%** of the population with high school supports
 - **49%** of the population with higher education supports
- **Considers Kosovo is lost:**
 - **20%** of the population with primary school agrees
 - **37%** of the population with high school agrees
 - **45%** of the population with higher education agrees
- **Agreement by which Serbia does not recognize Kosovo independence but accepts Kosovo’s UN membership, and gets A/CSM for Kosovo Serbs:**
 - **44%** of the population with primary school supports
 - **28%** of the population with high school supports
 - **26%** of the population with higher education supports
- **Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence but gets four northern Kosovo municipalities. A/CSM in the south and extraterritoriality for SOC monasteries:**
 - **41%** of the population with primary school supports
 - **32%** of the population with high school supports
 - **43%** of the population with higher education supports

- **Agreement by which Serbia recognizes Kosovo independence in return for exchange of territories where Serbia gets four northern Kosovo municipalities and gives parts of Preševo and Bujanovac:**

- **21%** of the population with primary school supports
- **14%** of the population with high school supports
- **13%** of the population with higher education supports

WHAT IS AV PLAN FOR KOSOVO - GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS

| | Government | Opposition |
|---|------------|------------|
| Recognition of Kosovo in return for EU membership | 8.9% | 38.8% |
| Recognition of Kosovo with the exchange of territories | 10.3% | 20.7% |
| Recognition of Kosovo if the northern part of Kosovo remains in Serbia | 22.7% | 19.2% |
| Recognition of Kosovo which entails a greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo Serbs (A/CSM) | 9.9% | 6.7% |
| Non-recognition of Kosovo with greater degree autonomy for Albanians | 15.9% | 6.7% |
| Non-recognition of Kosovo with no concessions to Albanians | 32.2% | 8% |

**DO YOU SUPPORT PRESIDENT VUČIĆ’S POLICY TOWARD KOSOVO?
WHAT IS THE AV PLAN FOR KOSOVO?**

| | Recognition of Kosovo in return for EU membership | Recognition of Kosovo with the exchange of territories | Recognition of Kosovo if the northern part of Kosovo remains in Serbia | Recognition of Kosovo which entails a greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo Serbs | Non-recognition of Kosovo with greater degree autonomy for Albanians | Non-recognition of Kosovo with no concessions to Albanians (A/CSM) |
|----------------------|---|--|--|---|--|--|
| Support | 8.3% | 10.5% | 23.8% | 8.1% | 16.9% | 32.4% |
| Don't support | 44.3% | 23.2% | 16.7% | 6.4% | 2.5% | 6.9% |

MEDIA TRADITIONAL VS. NEW MEDIA

- Respondents who follow traditional media show higher values on the Nationalism index (0.66) than those which follow new media (0.49).
- Respondents who follow traditional media show higher values on Ethnic distance toward Albanians index (0.69) than those which follow new media (0.49).
- **15%** of supporters of Government are informed through new media, while **49%** of those who do not support the government informs themselves through new media
- **59%** of respondents who follow traditional media support the Government (AV), while only **22%** of those who follow new media.
- **51%** of respondents who follow traditional media support AV policy on Kosovo, while only **20%** of those who follow new media support that policy.
- **16%** of respondents who follow traditional media believe that AV plan is to recognize Kosovo in return for EU membership, while that percentage rises to 30% among those which follow new media.
- **27%** of respondents who follow traditional media think that AV plan is to sign a non-recognition agreement with no concessions to Albanians, while only 11% of new media followers think that way.
- **27%** of respondents who follow traditional media believe that Kosovo is lost, while as much as **45%** of new media followers believe that Kosovo is lost.


VALUES

- Respondents with higher degrees of ethnic distance toward Albanians and nationalism are far less (than those with lesser degrees on mentioned scales) open to any other solution except Kosovo UN membership without formal recognition.


▶ FACTOR ANALYSIS - EMOTIONAL VS. RATIONAL KOSOVO NARRATIVE

Using the Factor Analysis, we have identified that there are two specific Narrative Groupings (NG) within the battery of questions about the Kosovo narratives. The first “Narrative Groupings” are grouped around emotions (Kosovo is the heart of Serbia), while the second is realistic narrative factor and is grouped around narrative which symbolizes realistic standpoint towards Serbian potentials in the process of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo (We are too small and weak to confront Western powers over Kosovo)


▶ Factor Analysis identified the difference of the internalization of these two NGs among the voters of the opposition and the government (AV). Those who do not support the government (AV) have adopted the realistic NGs, while the growth of support for the government is followed by the growth of internalization of emotional NG. It is very important to highlight that those who fully support the government (AV) are the ones that internalized both emotional and realistic NGs. Having that said, our assumption is that President Vučić was successful, to some extent, in sending realistic messages to a certain percentage of his hardcore supporters.




► Factor Analysis identified that the more internalized the emotional, political narrative is, the bigger is support for AV policies on Kosovo.




► Factor Analysis identified that the more internalized the realistic NG is, the bigger is the support to the Belgrade Pristina Dialogue.




- ▶ Factor Analysis identified that the support to an agreement, which includes the recognition of Kosovo independence, is much bigger among respondents, which internalizes the realistic political narrative than among those who internalize emotional, political narrative.




- ▶ Factor Analysis identified that the support to an agreement, which includes the recognition of Kosovo independence in return for Serbia joining the EU, is much bigger among respondents, which internalizes realistic political narrative, than among those who internalize emotional, political narrative.




- ▶ Factor Analysis identified that the support to an agreement, which includes the recognition of Kosovo independence with the exchange of territories, is much bigger among respondents, which internalize realistic political narrative, than among those who internalize emotional, political narrative.



- ▶ Factor Analysis identified the only agreement which is (almost) equally supported by those which internalize realistic and those which internalize emotional, political narrative: the agreement which doesn't include official recognition of Kosovo independence but includes the consent for Kosovo chair in UN, while Serbia gets the A/CSM.





CENTAR ZA
DRUŠTVENI DIJALOG I
REGIONALNE INICIJATIVE